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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether defendants retained counsel had an actual 
conflict of interest which denied defendant his right to < 
effective assistance of counsel• 
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish 
that defendant exercised unlawful control over the property of < 
Utah Power and Light Company and that the value of the property 
taken exceeded $250.00. 
3. Whether the prosecutorfs remarks in closing 
argument constituted harmless error. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 




: Case No. 20616 
Pr ior i ty No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Derek Andreason, was charged with the 
offense of theft, a second degree felony. 
Defendant was convicted in a jury trial held March 18-
20, 1985, of the offense of theft, a third degree felony in the 
Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sevier County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, presiding. The defendant was 
sentenced to a term of not more than five years in a Utah State 
Prison. The sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on 
probation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant occupies two buildings in Salina, Utah that 
receive Utah Power & Light electricity (Tr. 492). The Sampson 
Dairy Barn which defendant uses as his office (Tr. 492) and a 
large red brick warehouse building just north of the Sampson 
Dairy Barn (Tr. 492). Prior to establishing his construction 
business, defendant was an employee for Utah Power and Light Co. 
for a period of ten years (Tr. 488). He is a graduate in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
bui lding construct ion and has s tudied e l e c t r i c a l engineering 
(Tr. 4 8 9 ) . 
On September 4 , 1984, Larry M i l l s f an employee of Utah 
Power and Light , rece ived a c a l l from an independent party 
request ing power serv ice (Tr. 7 8 ) . While s erv ic ing the customer 
a t premises across the s t r e e t from defendant's p r o p e r t i e s , Mi l l s 
observed defendant's new warehouse bui lding and the e l e c t r i c a l 
hookups (Tr. 7 9 ) . 
Mi l l s went over t o the warehouse and observed someone 
i n s i d e using power for both l i g h t s and equipment (Tr. 7 9 ) . Mi l l s 
removed the meter covers from the meters a t the warehouse and 
found that the meter had been improperly bypassed by jumper 
cables being hooked t o wires going i n t o the meter box (Tr. 8 0 ) . 
Defendant's f a t h e r , an ex-employee of Utah Power and 
Light and o f f i c e manager in Sal ina for many years , approached 
Mi l l s and asked what he was doing (Tr. 87 ) . Mi l l s sa id he was 
checking on t h e source of the e l e c t r i c i t y for the warehouse to 
which Ray Andreason r e p l i e d that i t came from the Sampson Dairy 
Barn andf further r i t was none of Mi l l s 1 bus iness (Tr. 8 8 ) . 
M i l l s traced the cables through the lower port ion of the 
meter box and i n t o the warehouse (Tr. 80 , 8 1 ) . Mi l l s c a l l e d the Utah 
Power & Light Sal ina Off ice and requested Shawn Smith come t o the 
warehouse (Tr. 1 0 1 ) . When Smith arrived, they used a v o l t meter to 
measure the e l e c t r i c i t y and ascerta ined l i v e vo l tage (Tr. 101 r 106) . 
They went in s ide the warehouse and took inventory of the e l e c t r i c a l 
appl iances that showed evidence of recent usage (Tr. 86, 108) . During 
the i n v e s t i g a t i o n , Mi l l s and Smith took photographs of the improper 
meter hookup (Tr. 105-108) . 
- 2 -
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The fo l lowing dayf Mi l l s and Ron Rasmussen, a Utah 
Power & Light employee, i n v e s t i g a t e d the Sampson Dairy Barnf a l so 
owned by the defendant (Tr. 89 f 2 2 5 ) . Mi l l s opened the two 
meters a t t h i s l o c a t i o n and found that one had been connected so 
that e l e c t r i c i t y flowing would not be metered (Tr. 90-92, 2 2 6 ) . 
Again, Ray Andreason confronted Mi l l s and in response to M i l l s ' 
quest ions s t a t e d that the wire from the improper meter served 
three area l i g h t s (Tr. 92 -93) . Mi l l s t e s t e d the meter base and 
measured for e l e c t r i c i t y passing through i t and ascertained there 
was e l e c t r i c i t y present (Tr. 229) . 
Mi l l s gave the inventory l i s t computed from the 
warehouse and the s p e c i f i c a t i o n s from the Sampson Dairy Barn's 
three outdoor l i g h t s (Tr. 93) to h i s d i s t r i c t manager. Reed 
Burrows, (Tr. 277) . Burrows took the warehouse inventory l i s t , 
ass igned ki lowatt hours that these appliances would use i f they 
were on 20% of the time based on a formula that Utah Power & 
Light rout ine ly use s . Burrows then b i l l e d the defendant from 
April of 1983 to August of 1984, t o t a l i n g $2,899.45 (Tr. 280) . 
The three area l i g h t s were assessed at 157 Kilowatt hours a month 
for a 33-month period for $567.00. 
As a r e s u l t , defendant and h i s father were j o i n t l y 
charged, as co-defendants, with the f t of s erv ices (R. 1 ) . At 
t r i a l , both were represented by the same retained counsel (R. 8 ) . 
Defendant was convicted of the offense of t h e f t , a third degree 
fe lony (R. 6 8 ) . Ray Andreason was found not g u i l t y (R. 6 9 ) . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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i 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant received the e f fect ive assistance of retained 
< 
counsel who represented both defendant and a co-defendant. 
Defendant f a i l s to meet h i s burden of demonstrating a confl ict of 
in teres t . 
i 
The evidence was suff ic ient to support the jury's 
verdict . I t established that defendant exercised unauthorized 
control over Utah Power & Light property and that the value of 
th i s property was over $250.00. The prosecutor's remark was 
harmless error under the facts and circumstances of th i s case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S RETAINED COUNSEL, WHO ALSO 
REPRESENTED A CO-DEFENDANT, DID NOT 
PRESENT INCONSISTENT DEFENSES OR OTHER-
WISE HAVE AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
SO AS TO DENY DEFENDANT HIS RIGHT TO 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
The constitutional right to assistance of counsel for 
defense in a l l criminal prosecutions means the right to adequate 
or ef fect ive assistance of counsel. Cuyler v. Sullivan. 446 U.S. 
355 (1980). Inherent in th i s right i s a correlative right to 
representation that i s free from conf l ic ts of interes t . Wood v. 
Georgia. 450 U.S. 261 (1981); fi££ Cnyler v. Sullivan. 446 U.S. at 
348-350; Holloway v. Arkansas. 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Glasser V. 
United s t a t e s . 315 U.S. 60 (1942). However, requiring or 
permitting a s ingle attorney to represent co-defendants, i s not 
per ae v io la t ive of constitutional guarantees of ef fect ive 
assistance of counsel. This principle recognizes that in some 
cases certain advantages might result from joint representation 
- 4 -
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and may strengthen a common defense. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 
U.S. at 482-483. 
In Cnyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 346, 347, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
Holloway requires state trial courts to 
investigate timely objections to multiple 
representation. But nothing in our 
precedents suggests that the Sixth Amendment 
requires state courts themselves to initiate 
inquiries into the propriety of multiple 
representation in every case. Defense 
counsel have an ethical obligation to avoid 
conflicting representations and to advise the 
court promptly when a conflict of interest 
arises during the course of trial. Absent 
special circumstances, therefore, trial 
courts may assume either that multiple 
representation entails no conflict or that 
the lawyer and his clients knowingly accept 
such risk of conflict as may exist . . . 
"An attorney representing two defendants in a 
criminal matter is in the best position 
professionally and ethically to determine 
when a conflict of interest exists or will 
probably develop in the course of a trial." 
435 U.S., at 385, quoting State v. Davis. 110 
Ariz. 29, 31, 514 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1973). 
Unless the trial court knows or reasonably 
should know that a particular conflict 
exists, the court need not initiate an 
inquiry. 
£££ AlS£ United States v. Unger. 700 F.2d 445 (8th Cir. 1983), 
United States v. Benavide*. 664 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Burney. 756 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1985). 
Defendant's retained counsel did not raise the issue of 
a potential conflict of interest either prior to or during trial. 
Nor did the defendant voice any concern whatsoever to the trial 
court that his attorney's performance was in any way adversely 
affected by any conflict of interest. Without such an objection 
or other signal to the trial judge that a conflict might have 
-5-
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e x i s t e d , the defendant must demonstrate that h i s a t t o r n e y ' s 
performance was adversely a f fec ted by an actual c o n f l i c t of 
i n t e r e s t . Cuyler v . S u l l i v a n , 446 U.S. at 348; Parker v» Parrattr 
662 P.2d 479 (8th Cir . 1981); Greer v . Black, 758 F.2d 327 (8th 
Cir . 1 9 8 5 ) . A s imi lar a n a l y s i s app l i e s under Rule 44(c) of the 
< 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure c i t e d for comparative purposes 
in defendant's brief at 1 5 . In analyzing Rule 4 4 ( c ) f courts have 
held that a t r i a l c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e to comply with the Rule does 
not , of i t s e l f , require reversal of a conv ic t ion . jSfiLfi United 
S t a t e s v . A l v a r e z , 696 F.2d at 1309 (11th Cir . 1983); United 
S t a t e s v . A r i a s , 678 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1982)? United S t a t e s v . 
Benavidez. 664 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir . 1982) . The ra t iona le for these 
d e c i s i o n s i s tha t "neither the inquiry nor the advice i s i t s e l f 
the goal of the r u l e ; that goal i s preventing c o n f l i c t s . " 
Benavidez at 1258. 
Therefore, under both Cuyler and the dec i s ions 
i n t e r p r e t i n g Rule 4 4 ( c ) , the defendant must demonstrate an actual 
c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t , point ing t o s p e c i f i c ins tances in the record 
to suggest c o n f l i c t that i s real rather than hypothet i ca l . United 
S ta te s v . Mers. 701 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1983); United S t a t e s V» 
Fox, 613 P.2d 99 (5th Cir . 1980) . Addi t iona l ly , where co-
defendants1 statements are l a r g e l y corroborat ive , r e p e t i t i v e , or 
serve the same purpose, there i s no c o n f l i c t . United S t a t e s Y. 
Medel. 592 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1979) . As the court in Benavidez 
noted, cases of actual c o n f l i c t usual ly involve s i t u a t i o n s where: 
(1) The c o n f l i c t was brought to the t r i a l 
cour t 1 s a t t e n t i o n a t the o u t s e t of the 
t r i a l or a t the time when the c o n f l i c t 
f i r s t became apparent; (2) one defendant 
- 6 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had evidence that would have exculpated 
himself but inculpated a codefendant; 
(3) the prosecution1s evidence offered 
defendant a theory under which he could 
prove his own innocence by proving his 
codefendantfs guilt. 
Benavidez. 664 F.2d at 1259 (footnotes omitted). 
This case invo lves none of these s i t u a t i o n s . The t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s a t t e n t i o n was never brought to a pos s ib l e c o n f l i c t of 
i n t e r e s t . The defendant's were j o i n t l y charged (R. 1 ) , retained 
the same counsel (R. 8) and from the outse t of the t r i a l f both 
defendants presented a united front defense s tra tegy . Ray 
Andreason, defendant's fa ther , t e s t i f i e d that he and defendant had 
nothing to do with the improper wiring (Tr. 465, 466, 471 f 477, 
484 , 1501); defendant's corroborative testimony was that he had 
hired men to do the wiring and that defendant had personally not 
done any wiring within the meter base (Tr. 510, 511 , 522, 523, 
525 , 526, 535, 53 8 ) . They both offered corroborative testimony 
that the power to the warehouse came from e i ther the Dairy Barn or 
the temporary pole behind the warehouse (Tr. 471, 493 f 496, 500, 
514, 5 2 3 ) . Both defendant and h i s father admitted there was an 
improper hookup meter (Tr. 483, 530) . , 
The only s p e c i f i c instance defendant can point to in 
the e n t i r e t ranscr ip t of t r i a l where the t r i a l court arguably 
might have been apprised of a pos s ib l e c o n f l i c t was where Ray 
Andreason was being cross-examined as to what happened when 
Mr. Mi l l s confronted him s t a t i n g , "I've got reason t o be l i eve 
you're d iver t ing power" (Tr. 481) . Ray i n s i s t e d he knew nothing 
about i t f as i t was defendant's bui ld ing, he had no reason to know 
about the cable s t i c k i n g out of the meter (Tr. 480-483) . Taken in 
- 7 -
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contextr this statement does not directly imply that the defendant 
i 
did the improper hookup, but simply that Ray Andreason was not 
aware of the improper hookup a t that time (Tr. 4 8 1 ) . Ray further 
s t a t e d that defendant a l so knew nothing about i t (R. 4 8 2 ) . 
The claims of c o n f l i c t are based e n t i r e l y on appe l la t e 
counse l ' s theory and specu la t ion taken from the s i n g l e statement 
d i scussed above that Ray Andreason impl icated the defendant in 
order t o a s s e r t h i s own innocence. Such a theory i s unsupported 
i n the context of the e n t i r e record. Defendant has thus f a i l e d t o 
e s t a b l i s h that the co-defendants , Ray Andreason, exculpated 
himself by inculpat ing the defendant or that there was an actual 
c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t which adversely e f f e c t e d h i s own reta ined 
c o u n s e l ' s performance. 
POINT II 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO 
SUPPORT THE JURY'S CONCLUSION THAT 
DEFENDANT EXERCISED UNAUTHORIZED 
CONTROL OVER PROPERTY OF UTAH POWER 
& LIGHT COMPANY AND THAT THE PROPERTY 
HAD A VALUE OF MORE THAN $ 2 5 0 . 0 0 . 
The s tandards which t h i s Court a p p l i e s t o determine 
whether evidence i s s u f f i c i e n t t o support a convic t ion are as 
f o l l o w s : 
1 . The evidence and a l l inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from i t are to be 
reviewed by the appe l la te court in the l i g h t 
most favorable to the v e r d i c t , s t a t e v. 
Kerekes. 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980) . 
2 . I t i s the e x c l u s i v e funct ion of the jury 
to weigh the evidence and t o determine the 
c r e d i b i l i t y of the w i t n e s s e s , and i t i s not 
the prerogat ive of t h i s Court to determine 
g u i l t or innocence or to s u b s t i t u t e i t s 
judgment for that of the fac t f inder . JSl&lfi 
v . Lamm. Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); and 
S t a t e v . Romero. 554 P.2d 2 1 6 , 218 (Utah 
1 9 7 6 ) . 
_ D _ 
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3. Reversal for insufficiency of evidence is 
appropriate only when the evidence so viewed 
(under the first principle) is: "sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." state 
v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). 
Focusing on the more narrow issue of whether there is sufficient 
evidence to establish the elements of the offense, this Court 
announced the following standard of review in State v. Coffey. 564 
P.2d 777 (Utah 1977). 
[lit was the responsibility of the jury 
to determine whether the elements of the crime 
have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This court on appeal examines the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the verdict; 
and if it appears that the jury acted fairly 
and reasonably, the judgment will not be 
disturbed. 
The statutory elements of theft applicable to the facts 
of this case are set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404, 409 and 
412 (1953), as amended, as follows: 
76-6-404: A person commits theft if he 
obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof. 
76-6-409: (1) A person commits theft if he 
obtains services which he knows are available 
only for compensation by deception, threat, 
force, or any other means designed to avoid 
the due payment therefor. 
(2) A person commits theft if, having 
control over the disposition of services of 
another, to which he knows he is not 
entitled, he diverts such services to his own 
benefit or to the benefit of smother who he 
knows is not entitled thereto. 
(3) As used in this section "services" 
includes, but is not necessarily limited to, 
• . . public utility, and transportation 
services . . . electricity . . . and the like 
-9-
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( 
76-6-4122 (1) Theft of property and 
s e r v i c e s as provided i n t h i s chapter s h a l l be 
punishable as f o l l o w s : 
(b) As a fe lony of the th i rd degree i f : 
( i ) The value of the property or 
s e r v i c e s i s more than $250 but 
not more than $1000. 
The jury was properly ins tructed on the above s ta tutory elements 
i n Ins truc t ion No. 10 which required the jury t o f ind beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
# 
(1) That on or about the 1s t day of January, 
1983 and continuing u n t i l September 4 , 1984, 
at Sa l ina f Sevier Countyf S tate of Utahf the 
Defendants did obtain or e x e r c i s e unauthorized 
control over the property of Utah Power and 
Light Company, and 
(2) That the defendants had a purpose to 
deprive Utah Power and Light Company of such j 
property, and 
(3) That the property had a value of more than 
$250.00 but l e s s than $ l r 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
(R. 4 6 ) . 
The evidencef and all reasonable inferences that may be 
drawn therefrom when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
juryfs verdict were sufficient to establish the jury acted fairly 
and reasonably in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 
was guilty of the crime of theftf a felony of the third degree. 
A. THE STATE ESTABLISHED THAT THE 
DEFENDANT DID OBTAIN OR EXERCISE 
UNAUTHORIZED CONTROL OVER THE 
PROPERTY OF UTAH POWER AND LIGHT 
COMPANY. 
Defendant does not dispute that there was sufficient 
evidence to establish some of the elements of theft. He focuses 
s o l e l y on two e lements: whether the S t a t e e s t a b l i s h e d 
unauthorized control over property of Utah Power & Light , and 
whether the property had a value of more than $250.00. 
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In the instant casef the electrical meters had been 
tampered with (Tr. 79, 80f 90, 92). The defendant was the owner 
of the property serviced by the tampered meters (Tr. 492) and 
defendant admitted that there was an improper electrical meter 
hook up (Tr. 530). Mills and Smith ascertained that there was 
electricity at the improper hookup at the warehouse (Tr. 101, 
106). There was testimony that electricity had been used in the 
building (Tr. 79, 240-242). Mills and Rasmussen tested and 
ascertained that there was electricity flowing from the tampered 
meter servicing the area lights at the Sampson Dairy Barn facility 
(Tr. 90-92, 229-234). This service had been disconnected in 1976 
(Tr. 170) and the electricity had since passed through the 
unmetered connection (Tr. 178). 
It is unreasonable to assert that the defendant, a 
prior employee of Utah Power & Light (Tr. 488) and student of 
electrical engineering (Tr. 4 89) did not know that electricity was 
being improperly and purposely diverted through the meters for the 
benefit of his property. The facts proven: (1) alteration of the 
meters, (2) electrical power from the tampered meters and 
(3) use of electricity in the serviced premises, satisfy the 
standard of proof required for the jury to have found that the 
defendant did obtain or exercise control over the property of Utah 
Power & Light Company with a purpose to deprive the Company of 
services normally available only for compensation. Specificallyf 
defendant diverted such services (electricity) to his own benefit 
which he knew he was not entitled to. 
-11-
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i 
Although the question of theft of electricity has not 
often been the subject of adjudication cases confronting the 
issue have found that theft or asportation of electricity occurs 
when there is an alteration with the meter so that electrical 
current will flow through the meter without registering. The 
moment the electricity is taken away the subscriber is 
instantaneously in possession of stolen property. People v. 
HcLaughliHr 402 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1978). In State v. Kriss, 654 P.2d 
942 (8th Cir. 1982), the court found: 
The alteration of an electric meter so that 
electrical current will flow through the 
meter without registering serves to benefit 
only one person—the occupant of the premises 
served by the electric line. . . . It is not 
likely that one who would receive no benefit 
would alter an electric meter, unless at the 
request of the person whose premises were 
being served; and it is also unlikely that 
the person who is receiving free electricity 
does not know that such is the fact—and why. 
654 P.2d at 946. 
The fact that defendant was the owner of the property 
and that he was the one who primarily benefited from the free 
electricity raises a strong presumption that he was either 
directly responsible for or had knowledge of the fact that 
electricity was being stolen for his benefit. As owner of the 
property, defendant at the very least, exercised unauthorized 
control over the property of Utah Power & Light and certainly had 
the expertise of how to bypass an electrical meter to obtain 
unmetered electricity as a past employee of Utah Power & Light. 
The defendant failed to provide any other reasonable explanation 
and, indeed, there is none. 
-12-
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B. THE STATE ESTABLISHED THAT THE 
STOLEN PROPERTY HAD A VALUE OF 
MORE THAN $250.00. 
After Mr. Mi l l s had recorded the measurement of 
e l e c t r i c i t y a t the warehouse (Tr. 101, 106) and the Sampson Dairy 
Barn f a c i l i t y (Tr. 90-92 , 229-234) , and had taken inventory of the 
equipment i n the warehouse serv iced from the improper meter hook-
upsr he gave the data to h i s D i s t r i c t Managerf Mr. Reed Burrows 
(Tr. 277) . Mr. Burrows took a 20% load factor of the appliances 
evidencing current usage at the warehouse (Tr. 279) and ca lculated 
the b i l l from April of 1983 to August of 1984 at $2,899.45 
(Tr. 2 8 0 ) . The three area l i g h t s assessment was $567.00 (Tr. 
281 ) . To further demonstrate that the ca l cu la t ion by Burrows was 
a f a i r assessment of the unmetered e l e c t r i c i t y to the defendant's 
premises, the State pointed to the Utah Power & Light b i l l s 
submitted as evidence by defendant's wife (Tr. 456) noting that 
the f i r s t f u l l month's reading after the meters were properly 
reconnected had t r i p l e d (Tr. 592 ) . The defendant f a i l e d to offer 
h i s own expert wi tness to contradict Burrows' assessment methods. 
The nature of e l e c t r i c i t y , being what i t i s , the only 
way the value of the s t o l e n s e r v i c e s , in the ins tant case , could 
be ca lcu la ted was by taking the amount of Kilowatts assigned to 
defendant's property serviced by the tampered meters and ass ign 
the ra tes normally charged by Utah Power & Light for such s erv i ce . 
This i s what Mr. Burrows did (Tr. 277-307) f inding the value of 
the s t o l e n property was more than the required $250.00. 
- 1 3 -
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i 
POINT I I I 
THE PROSECUTOR'S REMARKS IN HIS CLOSING 
ARGUMENT CONSTITUTE HARMLESS ERROR. 
i 
Defendant a s s e r t s that the prosecutor made cer ta in 
remarks t h a t c a l l e d the j u r y ' s a t t e n t i o n t o matters t o which they 
would not be j u s t i f i e d in cons idering. In Utah, the law i s c lear 
that the prosecutor has the r ight and the duty to analyze the 
evidence as a whole and to evaluate any statements or deductions 
reasonably t o be drawn from such evidence. State v . Kazda. Utah, 
540 P.2d 949, 951 (1975); S tate v . Eaton, Utah, 569 P.2d 1114, 117 
(1977) . Furthermore, the t r i a l judge i s allowed considerable 
Tatitude of judgment as to what i s permiss ib le for counsel t o 
argue. Hales v . Peterson. 11 Utah 2d 411 , 360 P.2d 412 (1961) . 
In S ta te v , flautists, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 p.2d 530 
(1973) , the defendant in a rape case claimed that the prosecutor, 
in c l o s i n g argument was g u i l t y of misconduct. This Court, 
however, held tha t there was no misconduct s ince the prosecutor, 
i n summing up h i s case , has "wide d i s c r e t i o n and i s e n t i t l e d t o 
exerc i s e considerable freedom in express ing t o the jury h i s view 
of the evidence ." Xd. a t 533. As noted in S ta te v. Creviston, 
Utah, 646 P.2d 750 (1982): 
Considerable latitude is allowable in 
closing argument. Counsel may discuss 
fully both the evidence and all legitimate 
inferences arising from the evidence. Such 
argument may merit reversal if (1) the 
remarks called to the jurors1 attention 
matters which they would not be justified 
in considering in reaching a verdict, and 
(2) under the circumstances, the jurors 
were probably influenced by the remarks. 
State v, Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 
P.2d 422, 426 (1973). 
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656 P.2d a t 754 . 
The port ion of the prosecutor ' s c los ing argument in 
i s s u e i s as f o l l o w s : 
Nowr i f these two gentlemen were our only 
concern f we would probably l e t them go but 
t h e y ' r e not . Ladies and gentlemen, we have a 
concern for a l l of s o c i e t y , we have concerns 
i f t h i s goes on and that t h i s i s not an 
i s o l a t e d i n c i d e n t . This type of conduct i s 
pervasive and when we're— 
MR. MOWER: I o b j e c t . I think the 
prosecutor i s try ing to paint the p ic ture 
that there are others who are not charged and 
who are not before the Court. 
THE COURT: Object ion's overruled. This 
i s argument, Counsel. 
MR. BROWN: Perhaps the Defense would 
have you b e l i e v e that nobody e l s e i s doing i t 
but they are and everytime we have a jury 
t r i a l , people are watching. People are 
watching t o see how we administer j u s t i c e and 
so , before you determine that there i s some 
reasonable doubt—and I'm not sure what i t 
i s—but before you determine t h a t , you need 
to consider that we're not—we've heard a l o t 
about these two Defendants but they are not 
the only ones here and they are not the only 
ones we need to be concerned about. We've 
got to be concerned about the law. 
Now, we give the Defendants a l o t of 
r igh t s t o insure that we never convict an 
innocent man but while we're insuring that , 
we need to be concerned about how many who 
aren ' t innocent are turned loose and how i t 
a f f e c t s them and us but a l so how i t a f f e c t s 
o thers , others who are going to base the ir 
dec i s ions on conduct and what they know about 
how our system works. 
So i t i s a weighty dec i s ion but you need 
to consider everyone who i s involved here. 
(Tr. 588-590) . 
Admittedly, the prosecutor 's remarks may have ca l l ed 
the jurors ' a t t e n t i o n t o matters which they would not be j u s t i f i e d 
i n cons ider ing; however, given the substant ia l evidence supporting 
a p p e l l a n t ' s g u i l t (as noted in t h i s b r i e f ' s statement of f a c t s and 
Point I I , £iipiA,) there i s l i t t l e probabi l i ty that the jurors were 
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inf luenced by the remarks. .Sfifi State v- Smith. 675 P.2d 521, 527 
(Utah 1983) (holding that although the prosecutor ' s remarks in 
c l o s i n g argument were improper, they were harmless ) . { 
In determining whether or not conduct by a prosecutor 
i s p r e j u d i c i a l t o an appe l lant , a two-pronged t e s t has been s e t 
for th by t h i s Court. In S ta te v . Valde*. 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 
422 (1973) , the Court s t a t e s tha t a prosecutor ' s statement must 
• c a l l to the a t t e n t i o n of the jurors matters which they would not 
be j u s t i f i e d i n cons ider ing ." 
In the present case the statement by the prosecutor in 
c l o s i n g argument emphasized to the jury the importance of t h e i r 
duty to weigh a l l the evidence. The t r i a l judge, through h i s 
i n s t r u c t i o n s , s p e c i f i c a l l y Ins truct ion Number 5 (R. 43) , 
admonished the jury that they were the determiners of the f a c t s 
and judges of c r e d i b i l i t y (R. 41 -43) . 
Secondly, under Valdez, the quest ion a r i s e s whether the 
jury was "under the circumstances of the part icular case , probably 
inf luenced by those remarks11. The remark by the prosecutor in the 
present case , even i f found to be improper, has not been shown to 
have inf luenced the jury in the outcome of the d e c i s i o n . 
Certainly the statement by the prosecutor was not so overwhelming 
that the jury would t o t a l l y disregard any and a l l evidence 
presented by e i ther s ide and convict the defendant based on the 
prosecutor ' s remark. Under the circumstances, i f the prosecutor ' s 
comments were error, such was harmless, in that even without the 
error there was not "a reasonable l i k e l i h o o d of a more favorable 
r e s u l t for the defendant." s t a t e v. Fontana, Utah, 680 P.2d 1042, 
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1048 (1984)
 r jaUQJting S t a t e v . H u t c h i s o n . Utah, 655 P.2d 635 , 637 
(1982). £££ also Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Utah 
Code Ann. S 77-35-30 (1982). This i s demonstrated by the 
overwhelming evidence in this case: (1) the alteration of the 
meters, (2) e l e c t r i c i t y flowing through the meters, (3) use of 
e l e c t r i c i t y for the defendant's property serviced from the 
tampered meters, (4) defendant's expertise in e lec tr ica l wiring, 
and (4) evidence of equipment being used on defendant's 
e l e c t r i ca l l y unmetered premises. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant's conviction 
should be affirmed. 
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